Network Nodes
ALTIUS / ANVIL / ROADRUNNER squads
Autonomous Lattice effector nodes — drone units that share a common operating picture, self-coordinate targeting, and report track state continuously to the mesh. Roadrunner deploys 2 precision interceptors per launch; Altius deploys 15 anti-UAS drones; Anvil deploys 8 attrition drones.
HOSTILE TRACK
Track object in the Lattice data model — a fused contact with position, velocity, and classification attributes propagated across all nodes.
UNKNOWN / SUSPECT / HOSTILE
IFF pipeline — Lattice classifies contacts from UNKNOWN → SUSPECT → HOSTILE through sensor fusion and rules of engagement logic before authorizing engagement.
● RADAR (0.45° range) +5 conf/tick
● XRST +15 conf/tick
● EO/IR CONE +35 conf/tick
● GND DETECT +20 conf/tick
PACKET (swarm)
Low-cost UAS swarm — small, fast attritable drones designed to saturate defenses. High volume, low signature.
LOITERER
Loitering munition — autonomous platform that orbits a target area before terminal engagement. Slow but high-value threat.
Effector Systems
EMP INTERDICTION
Electronic warfare payload — area denial through directed RF pulse. Kill zone destroys all electronics. Outer disruption ring slows surviving threats 85% for 18 seconds. WARNING: destroys friendly XRST towers, drones, and CLG. Use as last resort only.
CLG GRID
Layered area denial system — Lattice-coordinated directed energy perimeter. Thermal-limited: max ~8 kills per activation before forced cooldown. FPV swarms have 50% hit chance per tick — small fast targets are difficult to track.
F-16V AIR SUPPORT
CAS request via Lattice — autonomous air wing tasked through the mesh. Departs Hualien Air Base northeast of base. Engages ground threats and enemy jets. Egresses when ammo expended.
TTU LINK
Tactical mesh uplink — direct telemetry synchronization. Improves packet intercept probability to 75%. Silences voice comms during active uplink.
ORS SCAN
Overhead persistent ISR — satellite sensor pass. Restores all offline XRST towers and repairs 20% base integrity. Trade-off: triggers enemy speed increase for 20 seconds.
Sensor Network
XRST-01 → XRST-04
Extended Range Sentry Towers — fixed 80-foot sensor nodes. Detect, classify, and track threats at ranges up to 7.5 miles autonomously. Feed classified tracks directly into the Lattice mesh. Go offline if physically breached.
AUTO-TASKING ENGINE
Autonomous decision layer — scores all identified threats by proximity, threat level, and time-to-impact. Automatically assigns effectors and deploys squadrons when AUTO mode is enabled. Player can override at any time.
SIMULATE JAMMING / ECM
Spectrum denial / Electronic Counter Measures — adversary degradation of the data link. Under jamming, each squad falls back to its local picture at jam onset. New contacts spawned after jamming are invisible to affected nodes. Auto-tasking goes offline.
LOITER / RE-ENGAGE cycle
Autonomous persistence loop — drone nodes loiter at intercept-ready distance when no target is available, immediately re-engaging when a new contact is authorized. 20% of each squad holds a tight reserve orbit as a last-ditch intercept layer.
Kill Feed log
Real-time track state log — every engagement event, classification change, and system state update propagated to all nodes in the mesh simultaneously.
PLA Ground Forces — Taiwan Invasion Order of Battle
Total Invasion ForceCSIS estimates PLA would commit ~400,000–500,000 troops for a full Taiwan invasion across all phases. Eastern Theater Command leads. First wave: ~25,000–35,000 troops via amphibious and airborne. Day 5+: 100,000+ if beachheads hold. Full campaign force including logistics, air defense, and follow-on: ~500,000. Three Eastern Theater Group Armies serve as primary maneuver forces.
73rd Group ArmyHQ Xiamen, Fujian — directly across the strait. ~80,000 troops, ~400 tanks, ~600 IFVs. 3rd and 73rd Amphibious Combined Arms Brigades. Primary assault force for LZ-ALPHA (Danshui, 15km from Taipei) and LZ-DELTA (Tamsui River). Supported by Type 075 LHD 广西 (1,000 troops) and Type 071 LPDs (800 troops each). CSIS main effort designation.
72nd Group ArmyHQ Huzhou, Zhejiang. ~80,000 troops, ~350 tanks. Secondary amphibious axis. LZ-BRAVO (Taoyuan coast). Objective: Taoyuan International Airport seizure by Day 3–4 — enables airlift of ~2,000 troops/day via Y-20 transport. CSIS identifies airport capture as the operational tipping point.
83rd Group ArmyHQ Wuhan. ~80,000 troops. Reserve and follow-on. Activates Day 4+ via Zhoushan staging. Provides forces for LZ-CHARLIE (Yilan NE) pinning attack. Includes 6th Amphibious Combined Arms Brigade.
15th Airborne Corps~35,000 paratroopers and air assault troops. 43rd, 44th, 45th Airborne Brigades. Y-20 and Y-9 transport aircraft required: ~400+ sorties. Targets Songshan Airport (Taipei city), Taoyuan Airport, Hualien. High-risk — airborne forces survive only if relieved within 24–48 hours. CSIS: airborne decisive if successful, catastrophic if not.
PLAN Marine Corps~30,000 marines across 8 brigades (expanded from 2 in 2017 specifically for Taiwan). 1st and 2nd Marine Brigades lead initial beach seizure. Equipped with ZTD-05 amphibious assault vehicles (~200), Z-10 attack helicopters, ZBD-05 IFVs. Rehearsed Taiwan beach operations annually in Eastern Theater exercises.
Rocket Force (PLARF)Eastern Theater PLARF: ~400–500 ballistic and cruise missiles pre-targeted on Taiwan. DF-17 hypersonic: 2 brigades (~72 launchers). DF-16 SRBM: ~200 missiles. DF-21D ASBM carrier-killer: ~80 missiles. CJ-10 LACM: ~300+ rounds (H-6K delivered). Day 1 salvo: CSIS estimates ~300–500 missiles in first 24 hours.
PLA Missile & Air Forces
PLAAF Total StrengthPLAAF operates ~1,500–1,800 total aircraft including all types. Eastern Theater Command front-line: ~400–500 combat aircraft. J-20: ~200 operational, ~20/year production. J-16: ~200+ operational, ~24/year production. J-10C: ~300+ across all theaters. H-6K/N bombers: ~100+ in service. In sim: 6 brigades representing ~480 Eastern Theater sorties.
DF-17 HypersonicPLA Rocket Force DF-17. Speed: Mach 5–10. Range: 1,800 km. Cost: ~$20M est. 2 brigades in Eastern Theater — est. 72 launchers, ~200 missiles total. Only Roadrunner can intercept. Used in Day 1 opening salvo — CSIS estimates ~50–80 DF-17s in first hours against high-value targets.
CJ-10 Cruise MissileH-6K-launched LACM. Range: 2,000 km. Cost: ~$3M. ~300+ in Eastern Theater inventory. 6 per H-6K = ~600 launch-ready rounds across ~100 H-6Ks. Terrain-hugging at 50–150m. CSIS Day 1 estimate: 100–150 CJ-10s in opening hours.
FPV / UAS SwarmsChina produces est. 100,000+ FPV drones/month across dozens of manufacturers. PLA stockpile: unknown but estimated in the hundreds of thousands. CH-4: ~200+ in PLA inventory, 50–100/year production. TB-001: ~100+ in service, 30–60/year. Combined UAS inventory makes volume saturation tactics essentially inexhaustible in a short campaign.
J-20 Stealth FighterChengdu J-20. ~200 operational. ~20/year production. Eastern Theater: 2 brigades, ~96 aircraft. Internal PL-15 carriage, AESA radar, 4 flare sets. In sim: represents ~96 Eastern Theater sorties. CSIS most dangerous air asset — low observable and designed specifically to defeat US air defenses.
J-16 Strike FighterShenyang J-16. ~200+ operational. ~24/year production. Eastern Theater: 2 brigades, ~192 aircraft. In sim: represents ~192 sorties. KG600 ECM pod, PL-15 BVR. Backbone of PLAAF offensive. Each carries 4–6 PL-15 BVR + 2 PL-10 WVR (typical combat load: 8 AAMs) at ~$1M each — one aircraft carries ~$6–8M in missiles.
H-6K BomberXian H-6K. ~100+ in service, 1 brigade in Eastern Theater (~18 aircraft). In sim: represents ~48 launch sorties. Never enters contested airspace — CJ-10 range 2,000km. CSIS: destroying H-6K bases or cratering airfields is the highest-value air interdiction target in the scenario. Each H-6K carries 6 CJ-10s = ~$18M in missiles per aircraft.
PLAN Naval Forces
PLAN Total FleetPLAN is now the world's largest navy by hull count. ~370 ships total. ~140 major surface combatants. Type 055 destroyers: 8 in service, 4 more building. Type 052D destroyers: 25+ in service. Type 054A frigates: 30+ in service. Type 075 LHDs: 3 commissioned (广西, 安徽, 四川), more under construction. Type 071 LPDs: 8 in service.
Taiwan Strait SAG (In Sim)Eastern Theater Surface Action Group: 南昌 + 延安 (Type 055, 112 VLS each), 贵阳 + 太原 (Type 052D, 64 VLS each), 岳阳 + 三亚 (Type 054A, 32 VLS each). Combined VLS: ~416 cells. Two Type 039B AIP submarines screening submerged. Type 901 replenishment ship 查干湖 extends operational range.
Amphibious Assault ForceFirst wave capacity: ~2,600–3,000 troops + vehicles + LCACs from 广西 LHD + 四川/昆仑山 LPDs. Full assault wave using all available Type 071/075: ~8,000–10,000 troops. PLAN amphibious shipping can carry est. ~20,000–25,000 troops total across all hulls — far below the ~80,000 needed. CSIS: civilian roll-on/roll-off vessels fill the gap at high risk.
Submarine ForcePLAN operates ~60 submarines total: 12 SSNs (Type 093), ~50 diesel/AIP SSs (Type 039 series). ~15–20 submarines estimated deployable in a Taiwan contingency. Yuan-class AIP (Type 039B): ~17 in service. USN assessment: PLAN diesel submarines are improving but still inferior to Virginia/Seawolf in blue water. Dangerous in the littoral.
☠️ PLA Threat Assets
FPV Swarm Drone
~$500 per unit. China produces est. 100,000+/month across dozens of manufacturers. DJI-derived components. Can be assembled in hours. Exchange ratio is the entire threat — one $500 drone can destroy a $50,000 interceptor.
AR-1 Missile (CH-4)
~$1–4M per unit. CASC produces est. 50–100/year. Exported to 10+ countries. Comparable to MQ-1 Predator cost.
AR-2 Missile (TB-001)
~$2–5M per unit. Est. 30–60/year production. Strategic asset — not attritable.
J-16 Fighter
~$70M per aircraft. PLA operates est. 200+ airframes. ~24/year production. Each carries 4–6 PL-15 + 2 PL-10 (typical combat load: 8 AAMs) at ~$1M each.
J-20 Fighter
~$110M per aircraft. PLA operates est. 200+ airframes. ~20/year production. China's only 5th-gen platform.
🦅 US Defense Assets
Altius-600
~$25–75K est. per unit. Anduril/Area-I. Attritable — designed to be expended. Tube-launched, 6-hour endurance, 11 lbs. payload. Counters the FPV exchange ratio problem.
Anvil Interceptor
~$50–100K est. per unit. Anduril autonomous interceptor. Attritable — cheaper than a Hellfire (~$150K) by design. Semi-attritable with survival chance on glancing intercepts.
Roadrunner-M
~$100–150K est. per unit. Anduril has publicly positioned Roadrunner below the cost of a Hellfire missile (~$150K). Reusable if intercept not required — per-intercept cost far lower than single-use missiles. Only US system capable of defeating PL-15 class missiles at this cost point. 550 days from white paper to first flight.
XRST Tower
Est. $500K–3M per tower. 80-foot fixed sensor node. Autonomous classification, 7.5 mile range. Launched Nov 2023. Proven border and perimeter security technology — applicable to Taiwan strait forward sensor network deployment.
F-16V / Fury CCA
~$5–15M est. per airframe. Collaborative Combat Aircraft — autonomous wingman to crewed fighters. Attritable at scale. First flight achieved under Fury program.
⚖ The Exchange Problem
Cost Exchange Ratio
A $500 FPV swarm destroying a $50,000 Altius = 100:1 unfavorable ratio. At scale this is unsustainable. The premise of autonomous attritable defense is collapsing this ratio — producing interceptors cheap and fast enough to match adversary volume. This is why Lattice exists.
Production Capacity
China produces an estimated 10M+ consumer drones/year with dual-use military conversion potential. US autonomous defense production is scaling rapidly but remains orders of magnitude smaller. Speed of production is now a strategic variable.
CSIS — First Battle of the Next War (2023)
Core Finding
The US and Taiwan defeat a Chinese amphibious invasion in most scenarios — but at severe cost. The US loses two aircraft carriers, 10–20 surface ships, 900+ aircraft, and thousands of personnel in three weeks.SOURCE: CSIS "First Battle of the Next War" — Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, 2023
UAS Role
Autonomous systems featured prominently as force multipliers. Attritable UAS extended strike reach without risking pilots. CSIS noted that cheap drone saturation is a key PLA tactic for overwhelming point defenses — directly modeled in this sim's wave composition.SOURCE: CSIS wargame assumption sets, 2023
Key Variable
Whether the US deploys forward assets to Taiwan in time is the single largest determinant of outcome. Models XRST pre-deployment as analogous forward sensor positioning.SOURCE: CSIS First Battle, scenario assumptions
Taiwan Scenario
Taiwan's ground forces hold the beaches. But missile saturation of C2 nodes in the first hours is modeled as near-certain. Autonomous distributed C2 — Lattice-style mesh — is the proposed counter.SOURCE: CSIS First Battle, ground campaign modeling
CNAS — Dangerous Straits (2023)
Core Finding
CNAS tabletop exercises found that ambiguity in the opening hours is the most dangerous phase. Decision timelines compress faster than human command structures can process. Autonomous systems with pre-delegated authority are the recommended response.SOURCE: CNAS "Dangerous Straits" tabletop exercise series, 2023
Sensor Fusion
CNAS exercises surfaced track correlation failure as a leading cause of engagement delays. Lattice-style sensor fusion directly addresses this. This sim models the UNKNOWN→SUSPECT→HOSTILE confidence pipeline as the solution.SOURCE: CNAS autonomous systems working group findings
Comms Denied
All CNAS scenarios modeled significant Chinese EW degradation of US data links in the first 24–48 hours. Nodes that could not operate autonomously under comms denial became liabilities. This directly motivated this sim's DEGRADED COMMS mode.SOURCE: CNAS EW vulnerability assessment, 2022–2023
Logistics
CNAS found that sustainment under fire — maintaining forward-deployed sensors and effectors — is a critical unsolved problem. Field operators who can repair systems in austere environments are as strategically valuable as the systems themselves.SOURCE: CNAS logistics vulnerability study, 2023
CSIS — Lights Out? Wargaming a Chinese Blockade (July 2025)
Core Finding
26 wargames on a Chinese blockade scenario. China could inflict serious hardship — especially targeting Taiwan's energy sector — but a blockade would not be low-risk or low-cost for Beijing. Any blockade creates escalatory pressures difficult to contain that could lead to large-scale war.SOURCE: CSIS "Lights Out? Wargaming a Chinese Blockade of Taiwan," July 2025
Deterrence Key
Taiwan and the US could strengthen deterrence by demonstrating a blockade is not feasible — forward-deployed sensors, autonomous defense networks, and pre-positioned assets are the deterrence layer. Models the XRST pre-deployment concept directly.SOURCE: CSIS Blockade Wargame, 2025
Escalation Risk
A blockade scenario generates massive convoy battles and unpredictable escalation dynamics — neither side can fully control the pace. Autonomous C2 systems that can operate under ambiguity and comms denial are more critical in a blockade than an invasion scenario.SOURCE: CSIS Blockade Wargame, 2025
CSIS — Confronting Armageddon: Nuclear Dynamics (December 2024)
Core Finding
15 wargame simulations on nuclear dynamics in a Taiwan invasion. Greatest pressure for nuclear use came when China's invasion was failing and CCP rule felt threatened — a "gamble for resurrection" scenario. US diplomacy was more important than nuclear brinksmanship.SOURCE: CSIS "Confronting Armageddon," December 2024
Implication
A successful conventional defense — stopping the invasion before China reaches crisis — is the best nuclear deterrent. This is why autonomous layered defense matters at the tactical level: winning conventionally prevents the scenario where nuclear use becomes rational for Beijing.SOURCE: CSIS Confronting Armageddon, 2024
Lessons from Ukraine & Red Sea (2023–2025)
UAS Dominance
Ukraine has demonstrated that cheap attritable drones can neutralize expensive conventional assets — including naval vessels and armored vehicles. FPV swarms costing hundreds of dollars have destroyed tanks costing millions. The exchange ratio problem modeled in this sim is now empirically validated.SOURCE: CSIS commentary, September 2025
C2 Resilience
Red Sea Houthi drone/missile campaign against commercial shipping showed that point defense systems alone are insufficient against saturation attacks. Layered autonomous defense — exactly what this sim models — is the architecture both CSIS and CNAS now recommend.SOURCE: CNAS autonomous systems assessments, 2024–2025
Irregular Warfare
CSIS assessment: Ukraine and the Middle East have confirmed irregular warfare and uncrewed systems are defining features of contemporary conflict. Nations that treat autonomous defense as experimental rather than operational are strategically behind.SOURCE: CSIS commentary, September 2025
How This Sim Maps to Wargame Findings
XRST Network
Models the pre-deployed forward sensor layer that CSIS identified as decisive. Towers going offline models C2 node attrition — the PLA's primary first-strike objective in both studies.
Auto-Tasking
Directly models the CNAS recommendation for pre-delegated autonomous authority. When AUTO mode is enabled, the system handles engagement decisions faster than human reaction time — the exact capability gap both studies identified.
Comms Denied
Simulates the CNAS EW scenario — squads fall back to their local picture at jamming onset and operate independently. Models realistic sensor blackout and degraded autonomy.
Wave Composition
FPV saturation + MALE strike drones + loitering munitions + fighter jets mirrors the layered PLA strike package in CSIS scenarios — designed to overwhelm single-layer defenses, requiring the layered response this sim models.
EMP as Last Resort
Both studies flagged friendly fire from EW/DE weapons as a serious risk. EMP in this sim destroys friendly sensors and drones in range — a genuine last resort, not a free win button.
Anduril Industries — Lattice-Integrated Effectors (In Sim)
Altius-600Anti-UAS attritable drone. ~$25–75K. Tube-launched, 11 lbs, 400+ km/h, 6+ hr endurance. Modular kinetic or EW warhead. Designed to be expended. In sim: 60 total inventory, 20% held in close-in reserve, kamikaze anti-FPV role. Each Altius kill tracked — PLA AI adapts composition if Altius depletes FPV effectively.
AnvilAutonomous UAS interceptor. ~$50–100K. Heavier than Altius, semi-attritable — 30% survival on glancing intercepts. In sim: 48 total inventory, targets CH-4 and TB-001, fallback anti-FPV when Altius saturated. Anvil kill data feeds PLA AI adaptation engine.
Roadrunner-MAutonomous turbojet interceptor. ~$100–150K. Vertical launch, supersonic, reusable if no intercept required. Only system that can defeat DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicles and PL-15 missiles. 550 days white paper to first flight. In sim: 24 total inventory — finite and irreplaceable until C-17 resupply. Depleted Roadrunner = uncontested hypersonic corridor.
XRST Tower NetworkExtended Range Sentry Tower. ~$500K–3M per unit. 80-foot fixed mast, autonomous detection and classification to 7.5 miles. In sim: 4 towers on real Taiwan terrain — Yangmingshan ridge (N), Keelung coast (NE), Taoyuan approach (SW), Danshui corridor (W). Tower destruction degrades sensor coverage. ORS orbital scan can restore offline towers.
Lattice C2 PlatformSoftware-defined command and control. Fuses radar, XRST, EO/IR, and acoustic sensor data into single operational picture. Autonomous engagement decisions. Comms-denied resilience — nodes fall back to local picture under jamming. This sim models the Lattice coordination layer. The confidence pipeline (UNKNOWN→SUSPECT→HOSTILE→engage at ≥80) is the core Lattice logic.
US Naval Forces — Carrier Strike Group 5
US Navy Pacific Fleet7th Fleet: ~50–70 ships, ~200 aircraft, ~40,000 sailors. Indo-Pacific Command: ~375,000 personnel, ~2,000 aircraft, ~200 ships. ⚠ TWO-FRONT WAR (Mar 2026): Lincoln + Ford fighting Iran in Operation Epic Fury. Reagan/Vinson/Eisenhower/Truman in maintenance. Only George Washington immediately available for Taiwan. CSIS analyst Mark Cancian: "When Iran erupted, the US didn't have the forces to make that threat real" — same problem applies to Taiwan simultaneously.
CVN-73 George WashingtonNimitz-class carrier. ~$4.5B. Forward-deployed Yokosuka. CVW-5: F/A-18E/F, F-35C, EA-18G, E-2D (~75 aircraft). ⚠ REAL STATUS Mar 2026: This is the correct carrier for a Taiwan scenario. CVN-76 Reagan in dry dock until Aug 2026. USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R. Ford conducting Operation Epic Fury air strikes against Iran. Carl Vinson in post-deployment maintenance. Only ~4–5 of 11 carriers deployable at any given time. A simultaneous Taiwan crisis is the two-front war scenario planners fear — and it is the current reality. George Washington completing Yokosuka maintenance is the only immediately available Pacific carrier.
CG-67 Shiloh / CG-73 Port RoyalTiconderoga-class cruisers. ~$1.2B each. 122-cell VLS. Primary BMD platforms — SM-3 Block IIA intercepts PLAN ballistic missiles. Two cruisers give the CSG overlapping coverage. CSIS: losing cruiser BMD capability exposes the carrier to DF-21D.
4x Arleigh Burke DDGsDDG-109, DDG-89, DDG-110, DDG-71. ~$1.8B each. 96-cell VLS. SM-6 area defense, Tomahawk LACM, Harpoon anti-ship. Forward screen against PLAN surface and submarine threats. CSIS: first destroyer loss significantly degrades CSG AAW umbrella.
SSN-774 Virginia / SSN-21 SeawolfVirginia-class ~$3.4B. Seawolf-class ~$3.0B. Most lethal US assets in the strait. PLAN ASW capability inferior to US submarines. Virginia and Seawolf sinking PLAN amphibious ships is the most likely mechanism for early US naval success per CSIS. Seawolf is fastest, deepest-diving, most capable attack submarine in the world.
Japan DDG Squadron (Japan Basing ON)DDG-107 Gravely, DDG-85 McCampbell (Yokosuka), JS Atago DDH-177 (JMSDF). Fastest-response US/allied naval assets — on station within 24 hours of Japan basing authorization. JS Atago carries SM-3 Block IIA — adds non-US BMD capability. CSIS: Japan basing is the single largest variable in US effectiveness.
US/Allied Air Forces
USAF/USN Total Pacific AirUSAF Pacific Air Forces: ~350 combat aircraft across Guam, Japan, South Korea, Hawaii. PACAF F-35As: ~100+. Carrier air wing: ~75 aircraft per carrier. Day 1 available: ~300 sorties (carrier + Japan-based). With Japan basing: ~450–500 sorties. PLAAF Eastern Theater: ~480 sorties. CSIS: numbers roughly even — quality/stealth advantage is decisive.
CVN-73 Air WingVFA-27 (F/A-18E, 12 aircraft), VFA-102 (F/A-18F, 12 aircraft), VAQ-136 (EA-18G, 5 aircraft). Total: ~144 sorties in sim. EA-18G Growler: only ~140 in USAF/USN inventory total — irreplaceable EW asset. ALQ-99 jamming reduces PLAN hit probability across all US platforms.
Japan-Based F-35s (Japan Basing ON)13th FS Misawa (24 F-35A), 67th FS Kadena (24 F-35A), VMFA-121 Iwakuni (20 F-35B). Total: ~204 additional sorties. US operates ~450 F-35As total (USAF), ~280 F-35Cs/Bs (USN/USMC). CSIS: F-35 from Kadena most effective single asset — stealth penetrates PLAN IAMD that stops legacy aircraft.
Strategic BombersB-21 Raider: 6 sorties in sim. First B-21 delivered 2023 — fewer than 20 operational as of 2025, planned fleet ~100. B-2 Spirit: ~16 sorties in sim. Only 20 B-2s built, ~16 operational. Each B-2 loss is ~1/16th of total US strategic stealth bomber capacity. B-21 eventually replaces B-2. Guam-based B-2s within DF-26 range — survivability a concern.
F-16V Block 70 (ROCAF)Taiwan operates 141 F-16Vs. ~$80M per aircraft. Based at Hualien (hardened mountain hangars). AIM-120 AMRAAM, AIM-9X, JDAM. Hualien is 55% likely to be hit in Day 1 opening salvo — halving sortie capacity. Taiwan has been upgrading F-16As to F-16V standard since 2019. In sim: 16 sorties total. Halved to 8 if Hualien struck in Day 1.
Taiwan's Own Defenses
HIMARSM142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. Taiwan received 29 systems in 2024. 80km range, precision GPS-guided rockets. In sim: 6 salvos total, manual fire timing, 3-day cooldown. C-17 resupply adds 2 per drop. Real CSIS finding: Taiwan HIMARS can strike Fujian coast landing ships and staging areas — extends Taiwan reach beyond the strait.
ROC Patrol BoatsTuo Chiang-class corvettes. Hsiung Feng II/III anti-ship missiles. Fast, shallow-draft, difficult to target. ROC Navy primary counter to PLAN amphibious forces in the strait. In sim: 4 boats establish picket line, independently hunt landing ships, each claims own target lane.
Presidential Office Defense Grid25.0400°N, 121.5120°E. Taiwan C2 center. PLA doctrine targets political infrastructure first — decision paralysis is the operational objective. In sim: 5 integrity points, each breach degrades capacity. Landing ships reaching the coast reduce integrity directly. Defending this is the entire mission.
Sim Creator — Why This Project
I built this from a Mojave ranch to understand Lattice-style real-time C2 and autonomy at machine speed.
The mission is everything: countering the China/Taiwan threat timeline in 2027.
I don't care about hours or titles — I care about being ready when it counts.
No formal CS background — just a business degree, heavy machinery experience, and relentless iteration on a phone in the desert.
Off-grid, solar + Starlink powered. Zero excuses.
This is not a game. It's an experiment in threat fusion, auto-tasking, and layered defense — so we're not caught flat-footed.
Open to connect on defense tech, CUAS, contested environments, or deployment challenges.
No ego — just results.
— Chris Nordahl
Lancaster, CA | 34.8165°N, 118.2000°W | Defending: 25.0400°N, 121.5120°E
Technical Stack
Rendering
Mapbox GL JS — satellite + vector layers, dynamic GeoJSON sources for all units, projectiles, explosions, and sensor rings. Pitched 45° for operational depth.
Logic
Vanilla ES6 JavaScript. Zero frameworks. Single 250ms update loop handling movement, sensor fusion, confidence scoring, intercept geometry, and autonomous tasking across all assets simultaneously.
Build Pipeline
Python build script splits single-source HTML into modular JS files for GitHub Pages deployment. Keeps global constants synchronized across all modules.
Deployment
GitHub Pages — lattice-runner.github.io. Live ADS-B data via OpenSky Network API. Audio via Dropbox CDN. Built and iterated off-grid on solar + Starlink.
Methodology
AI-assisted development as a deliberate workflow — not a shortcut. Every system was designed, debugged, and iterated intentionally. The sim models real constraints: sensor fusion delays, engagement envelopes, EW degradation, comms-denied autonomy.
Political Escalation by Day — What CSIS & CNAS Model
DAY 1Ambiguity Phase
Washington debates whether PLA missile strikes constitute an act of war. CNAS found this ambiguity is the most dangerous phase — decision timelines compress faster than human command structures can process. Beijing frames action as "internal law enforcement." US allies hesitant to commit without clarity. Taiwan alone for the first hours.SOURCE: CNAS "Dangerous Straits," 2023
DAY 1–2Emergency Session
UN Security Council emergency session called. China vetoes any resolution. US, UK, France condemn. Russia abstains or supports China. Other governments slow to respond — some believe it is saber-rattling, as Western governments did before Russia invaded Ukraine. Beijing uses all diplomatic channels to pressure third countries to stay neutral.SOURCE: CSIS "Reunification Would Be Pyrrhic Victory," 2024
DAY 2–3US Authorization
US Congress debates Taiwan Relations Act authorization. CSIS notes the US is "wary of acting too drastically, which might escalate the crisis, preclude off-ramps for China, or damage the global economy." President authorizes forward deployment of naval assets but not direct strike operations. Carrier strike group ordered to the Philippine Sea.SOURCE: CSIS escalation analysis, 2024
DAY 3–4Japan Decision Point
CSIS wargame found Japan basing rights are the single largest variable determining US military effectiveness. Japan must decide whether to allow US strike operations from Okinawa and Misawa. Refusal forces US to operate from Guam — dramatically reducing sortie rates. China signals it will treat Japanese bases as legitimate targets if used. Tokyo faces existential choice.SOURCE: CSIS First Battle of the Next War, 2023
DAY 4–5Economic Shock
Global semiconductor supply disruption triggers financial market panic. Taiwan produces 92% of the world's most advanced chips. Insurance markets invoke war clauses — shipping premiums spike. CSIS notes "disruptions to vital shipping lanes and critical inputs like semiconductors may be so severe that sanctions become moot — the military conflict itself acts as the sanction."SOURCE: CSIS "Sunk Costs" sanctions analysis, 2024
DAY 5+US Reinforcements
CSIS found pre-positioned US forces are decisive — "whether the US deploys forward assets in time is the single largest determinant of outcome." B-21 Raider strike packages authorized from Guam. Carrier strike group reaches operating area. Anduril autonomous systems pre-positioned on Taiwan begin full activation. The sim models this: US assets arrive Day 5+.SOURCE: CSIS First Battle, 2023
DAY 7+Nuclear Shadow
CSIS December 2024 study: greatest pressure for nuclear use comes when China's invasion is failing and CCP rule feels threatened. If Taiwan survives past Day 7 and China's amphibious assault is failing, Beijing faces a choice between accepting defeat or escalating. US diplomacy — not nuclear brinksmanship — is the recommended response. Off-ramps must be pre-negotiated.SOURCE: CSIS "Confronting Armageddon," December 2024
DAY 10+Coalition Solidifies
CNAS found that capable US allies add significant combat power and strategic significance. Australia, South Korea, UK commit assets. NATO invokes Article 5 consultations. China's attempt at a rapid fait accompli has failed — now faces a protracted war against a coalition with global supply chains. CSIS: a successful conventional defense at this stage is the best nuclear deterrent.SOURCE: CNAS "Dangerous Straits," 2023 / CSIS "Confronting Armageddon," 2024
Key Political Variables
The Japan Question
CSIS ran scenarios with and without Japan basing. Without Japan: US loses air superiority within days, Taiwan falls. With Japan: US maintains sortie rates, invasion fails. Japan's decision in the first 48 hours may be the most consequential political event of the conflict.SOURCE: CSIS First Battle, 2023
China's Off-Ramp Problem
CSIS blockade study: "The United States and Taiwan should develop a creative menu of offers that allow China to declare victory and lift operations without extracting substantive concessions." Xi Jinping needs a way to stop that does not look like defeat domestically. Without one, escalation continues regardless of battlefield outcome.SOURCE: CSIS "Lights Out," July 2025
Taiwan's Will to Resist
CSIS found Taiwan's ground forces holding the beaches is essential — without Taiwanese resistance the scenario is unwinnable regardless of US intervention. CNAS: Taiwan's military posture and will to fight is the foundation everything else rests on. The sim models this as base integrity — if Taipei falls, the mission fails regardless of kills.SOURCE: CSIS First Battle / CNAS Dangerous Straits, 2023
Trump Factor (2025–)
When asked about Justice Mission-2025 exercises, President Trump said: "I have a great relationship with President Xi. He hasn't told me anything about it." CSIS notes US strategic ambiguity has historically deterred Beijing — but ambiguity about US commitment to Taiwan may embolden rather than deter. The political variable the wargames cannot fully model.SOURCE: NPR / CNN, December 2025